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ABSTRACT
In cooperative man-machine interaction, it is necessary but not sujjicimt for a system to respond
truthfully and informatively t o a user's question. In particular, if the system has reason t o believe that its
planned response might mislead the user, then it must block that conclusion by modifying its response.
This paper focusses on identifying and avoiding potentially misleading responses by acknowledging types
of 'informing behavior' usually expected of an expert. We attempt t o give a formal account of aeveral
types of assertions that should be included in response t o questions concerning the achievement of some
goal (in addition to the simple answer), lest the questioner otherwise be misled.

1. Introduction]
In cooperat.ive man-machine interaction, it is necessary but not aujjicient for a system t o respond
truthfully and informatively to a user's question. In particular, if the system has reason t o believe that its
planned response might mislead the user to draw a false conclusion, then it must block that conclusion by
modifying or adding to its response.
Such cooperat,ive behavior was investligated in (51, in which a modification of Grice's Maxim o j Quality

- 'Be truthful' - is proposed:

If you, the speaker, plan t o say anything which may imply for the hearer something that you
believe to be false, then provide further information t o block it.
This behavior was studied in the context of interpreting certain definite noun phrases. In this paper, we
investigate this revised principle as applied to responding to asem' plan-related questions. Our overall aim
is to:
1. characterize tractable cases in which the system as respondent (R) can anticipate the

possibility of the user/questioner (Q) drawing false conclusions from its response and hence
alter it so as t o prevent this happening;
2. develop a formal method for computing the projected inferences that Q may draw from a
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particular response, identifying those factors whose presence or absence catalyzes the
inferences;
3. enable the system t o generate modifications 01 its response that can defuse possible false

inferences and that may provide additional useful information as well.
In responding to any question, including those related to plans, a respondent (R) must conform to
Grice's first Mazim of Quantity as well as the revised Mazim o j Quality stated above:
Make your contribution as informative as ia required (lor the current purposes of the
exchange).
At best, if R's response is not so informative, it may be seen as uncooperative. At worst, it may end up
violating the revised Mazim of Quality, causing Q to conclude something R either believes t o be lalse or
does not know t o be true: the consequences could be dreadful. Our task is t o characterize more precisely
what this expected informativeness consists of. In question answering, there seem t o be several quite
different types of information, over and beyond the simple answer t o a question, that are nevertheless
expected. For example,
1. When a task-related question is posed to an expert (R), R is expected t o provide additional
information that he recognizes as necessary t o the performance of the task, of which the
questioner (Q) may be unaware. Such response behavior was discussed and implemented by
Allen (11 in a system t o simulate a train information booth attendant responding t o requests
for schedule and track information. In this case, not providing the expected additional
information is simply uncooperative: Q won't conclude the train doesn't depart a t any time if
?? fails t o volunteer one.
2,

1) ( t : ~ r ~ s p e c tto discussions and/or arguments, a speaker contradicting another is expected t o
s u p p ~ a this contrary contention. Again, failing t o provide support would simply be viewed as
unc:)operative (2, 31.

3. With respect to an expert's responses to questions, if Q expects that R would inform him of P
if P were true, then Q may interpret R's silence regarding P as implying P is not true.3 Thus if
13 knows P t o be true, his silence may lead to Q's being misled. This third type of expected
informativeness is the basis for the potentially misleading responses that we are trying to
avoid and that constitute the subject of this paper.

What is of interest t o us is charact~rizingthe Ps that Q would expect an expert R t o inform him of, if
they hold.

Notice that these Ps differ from script-based expectations [8], which are based on what is

taken to be the ordinary course of events in a situation. In describing such a situation, if the speaker
dI)esnptexplicit.ly reference some element P of the script, the listener simply assumes it is true. On the
other hand, t,he P s of interest here are based on normal cooperative discourse behavior, as set out in
Grice'~maxims. If the speaker doesn't make explicit some information P that the listener believes he
would possess and inform the listener of, the listener assumes it is false.

In this paper, we attempt to give a formal account of a sm5class of P s that should be included (in
addition to the simple answer) in response to questions involving Q's achieving some goal4 - e.g., .Can I

3 ~ h i sis m interactional version of what Reiter 1131 has called the mClosedWorld Assumptionmand what MeCarthy [Q]has
discussed in the context of mCircumscription~.
4~ companion paper [6] discusses responses which may mis1e.d Q into assuming some default which R knows not to hold.
Related work [I] discusses providing indirect or modified responses to yes/no questions where a direct response, while
truthful, might mislead Q.

drop CIS577?', -1 want to enrol in CIS577?", 'Now do I get t o Marsh Creek on the E x p r e ~ s w a y ? etc.,
~,
lest that response otherwise mislead Q. In this endeavor, our first step is to specify that knowledge that an
expert R must have in order to identify the P s that Q would expect t o be informed of, in response t o his
question. Our second step b t o formalize that knowledge and show how the system can use it. Our third
step is to show how the system can modify its planned response so as t o convey those Ps. In this paper,
Section 2 addresses the first step of this process and Sections 3 and 4 address the second. The third step
we mention here only in passing.

2. Factors in Computing Likely Informing Behavior]
Before discussing the factors involved in computing this desired system behavior, we want t o call
attention t o the distinction we are drawing between adions and events, and between the atated goal of a
question and its intended goal. We limit the term action to things that Q bas some control over. Things
beyond Q's control we will call eventa, even if performed by other agents. While events may be likely or
even necessary, Q and R nevertheless can do nothing more than wait for them to happen. This distinction
between actions and events shows up in R's response behavior: if an action is needed, R can suggest that
Q perform it. If an event is, R can do no more than inform Q.

Our second distinction is between the atated goal or =S-goalmof a request and its intended goal or
#I-goalw.The former k the goal most directly associated with Q's request, beyond that Q
information.

bnow the

That is, we take the S-goal of a request t o be the goal directly achieved by using the

information.
Underlying the stated goal of a request though may be another goal that the speaker wants t o achieve.
This intended goal or 'I-goa?" may be related to the S-goal of the request in any of a number of ways:
e The I-goal may be the
a

pame as the S-goal.

The I-goal may be more abstract than the S-goal, which addresses only part of the I-goal.
(This is the standard goal/sub-goal relation found in hierarchical planning (141.) For exampie,
Q's S-goal may be t o delete some files (e.g., 'How can I delete all but the last version of
FOO.MSS?#), while his I-goal may be to bring his file usage under quota. This more abstract
goal may also involve archiving some other files, moving some into another person's directory,
etc.
The S-goai may be an enaFAing condition for the I-goal. For example, Q's S-goal may be t o get
read/write access to a file, while his I-goal may be t o alter it.
The I-goal may be more general than the S-goal. For example, Q's S-goal may be to know how
t o repeat a controEN, while his I-goal may be t o know how to effect multiple sequential
instances of a control character.

a

-

Conversely, the Egoel may be more specific than the S-goal for example, Q's S-goal may be
t o know how t o send fiks t o someone on another machine, while his I-goal is just t o send a
particular file t o a local network user, which may dlow for a specialized procedure.

Inferring the 1-goal corresponding t o an S-goal is an active area of research 11, Carberry83, 10, 111. We
assume for the purposes of this paper that R can successfully do so. One problem is that the relationship
that Q believes t o hold between his S-goal and his I-goal may not actually hold: for example, the S-goal

may not fulfill part of the 1-goal, or it may not instantiate it, or it may not be a pre-condition for it. In
fact, the Sgoal may not even be possible t o effect!

This failure, under the rubric 'relaxing the

appropriate-query assumption', is discussed in more detail in [lo, 111. It is also reason for augmenting R's
response with appropriate Ps, as we note informally in this section and more formally in the next.
Having drawn these distinctions, we now claim that in order for the system t o compute both a direct
answer t o Q's request and such P s as he would expect t o be informed of, were they true, the system must
be able t o draw upon knowledge/beliefs about

the events or actions, if any, that can bring about a goal
their enabling conditions
the likelihood of an event occuring or the enabling conditions for an action holding, with
respect t o a state

-

ways of evaluating methods of achieving goals for example, with respect to simplicity, other
consequences (side effects), likelihood of success, etc.
general characteristics of cooperative expert behavior
The roles played by these different types d knowledge (as well as specific examples of them) are well
illustrated in the next section.

3. Formali~ingKnowledge for Expert Response
In this section we give examples of how a formal model of user beliefs about cooperative expert behavior
can be used t o avoid misleading responses t o task-related questions

- in

particular, what is a very

representative set of questions, those of the form 'How do I do X?'. Although we use logic for the model
because it is clear and precise, we are not proposing theorem proving as the means of computing
cooperative behavior. In Section 4 we suggest a computational mechanism. The examples are from a
domain of advising students and involve responding t o the request .I want to drop CIS577'.

The set of

individuals includes not only students, instructors, courses, etc. but also states. Since events and actions
change states, we represent them as (possibly parameterized) functions from states t o states. All terms
corresponding to events or actions will be underlined.

For these examples, the following notation is

convenient:

GI
R
Sc
RBIP)

RBQB(P)

admissible(4S))

want(s,P)

the user
the expert
the current state of the student
R believes proposition P
R believes that Q believes P
eventlaction e can apply in state S
a is a likely eventfaction in state S
P , a proposition, is true in S
x wants P to be true

T o encode the preconditions and consequences of performing an action, we adopt an axiomatiaation of
STRIPS operators due t o [Chestez83, 7, 15). The preconditions on an action being applicable are encoded
using .holdsm and .drnissiblea (essentially defining .admissiblem). Namely, if c l ,
on an action a ,

..., cn are preconditions

holds(c1,s) &...& holds(cn,s) =+ admissible(a(s))
a's immediate consequences p l , ..., pm can be stated as
admissible(a(s)) =+holds(p1, a(s)) & ... t holdsfpm, a(s))

A frame axiom states that only p l , ..., pm have changed.
-(p=pl) &

... & -.(p=pm)

& holds(p,s)3 & admissible(a(s)) =+ holds,a(s))

In particular, we can state the preconditions and consequences of dropping CIS577. (h and n are
variables, while C stands for CIS577.)
RB(holds(enrolled(h, C, fall), n) & holds(date(n)<Nov16, n)
=+admissible(drop(h,CAn)))

RB(~(p=enrolled(h,C,fall)) & admissible(drop@,CAn)) & holds(p,n)
=+ holds(p,drop(h,C#n)))
Of course, this only partially solves the frame problem, since there will be implications of p l ,

..., pm

in

general. For instance, it is likely that one might have an axiom stating that one receives a grade in a
course only if the individual is enrolled in the course.
Q's S-goal in dropping CIS577 is not being in the course. By a process of reasoning discussed in (10, 111,

R may conclude that Q's likely intended goal (I-goal) is not failing it. That is, R may believe:
RBQB(holds(-fail(Q,C), drop(Q,ClScj))5
RB(want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) )
What we claim is: (1) R must give a truthful response addressing a t least Q's S-goal; (2) in addition, R
may have to provide information in order not to mislead Q; and (3) R may give additional information to
be cooperative in other ways. In the subsections below, we enumerate the cases that R must check in
effecting (2). In each case, we give both a formal representation of the additional information to be
conveyed and a possible English gloss. In that gloss, the part addressing Q's S-goal will appear in normal
type, while the additional information will be underlined.
For each case, we give two formulae: a statement of R's beliefs about the current situation and an
axiom stating R's beliefs about Q's expectations. Formulae of the first type have the form RB(P).
Formulae of the second type relate such beliefs to performing an informing action. They involve a
statement of the form

RE[P] =+ likely(i, Sc),
where i is an informing act. For example, if R believes there is a better way to achieve Q's goal, R is
likely to inform Q of that better way. Since it is assumed that Q has this belief, we have
QB( RB[P]

* likely(i, Sc) ).

slt will also be the cure that RBQB(sdrnissible(drop(Q,C~Sc))) if Q's asks mWowcan I drop CIS577fm,but not if he rsks
.Can I drop CIS577fm. In the latter ease, Q must of course believe that it
be admissible, or why ask the question. ?n
either case, R's subsequent behavior doesn't seem contingent on his beliefs about

beliefs about admissibility.

where we can equate 'Q believes i is likely' with 'Q expects i.'

Since R has no direct access t o Q's

beliefs, this must be embedded in R's model of Q's belief space. Therefore, the axioms have the form
(modulo quantifier placement)
RBQB( RB[Pj + likely(i, Sc) ).
An informing act is meant t o serve as a command t o a natural language generator which selecb
appropriate lexical items, phrasing, etc. for a natural language utterance. Such an act has the form
inform-that(R,Q,P)

R informs Q that P is true.

3.1. Failure of enabling comdl.i;ions

Suppose that it is past the November 15th deadline or that the official records don't show Q enrolled in
CIS577. Then the enabling conditions for dropping it are not met. That is, R believes Q's Sgoal cannot be
achieved from Sc.
(11 RB(want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) & -admissible(drop(Q,Cfic)))

Thus R initially plans to answer 'You can't drop CIS577'.

Beyond this, there are two possibilities.

3.1.1. A way

If R knows another action b that would achieve Q's goals (cf. formula 121)' Q would expect t o be
informed about it. If not so informed, Q may mistakenly conclude that there is no other way. Formula
131 states this belief that R has about Q's expectations.
(21 RB((3b) ladmissiblc(b(Sc)) & holds(-d'ail(Q,C), b(Sc))])

R's full response is therefore "You can't drop 577; you can b.'

For instance, b could be changing status to

auditor, which may be performed until December 1.
8.1.2.

No wny

If R doesn't know of any adion or event that could achieve Q's goal (cf. 141)' Q would expect to be so
informed. Formula 1.51 states this belief about Q's expectations.
141 RB(-.(3a)[admissible(a(Sc)) & holds(-.fail(Q,C),a(Sc))])

T o say only that Q cannot drop the course does not exhibit expert cooperative behavior, since Q would be
uncertain as t o whether R had considered other alternatives. Therefore, R's full response is 'You can't
drop 577; there iaa 2 anything you can do to prevent jailing.'
Notice that R's analysis of the situation may turn up additiooal informaticjn which a cooperative expert

could provide that does not involve avoiding misleading Q. For instance, R could indicate enabling
conditions that prevent there being a solution: suppose the request t o drop the course is made after the
November 15th deadline. Then R would believe the following, in addition to (11

RB(holds(enrolled(Q,C,fall),Sc) & holds(date(Sc)>Novl5,Sc))
More generally, we need a schema such as the following about

Q'B

beliefs:

In this case the response should be *You can't drop 577; Pi i8nY true.'

Alternatively, the language

generator might paraphrase the whole response as, *if Pi were true, you could drop.'
Of course there are potentially many ways to try to achieve a goal: by a single action, by a single
event, or by an event and an action,

...

In fact, the search for a sequence of events or actions that would

achieve the goal may consider many alternatives. If all fail, it is far from obvious which blocked condition
to notify Q of, and knowledge is needed to guide the choice. Some heuristics for dealing with that problem
a;,

give11 in 1121.

3.2. An nonp~oductiveset
Suppose the proposed action does not achieve Q's 1-goal, cf. 161. For example, dropping the course may
still mean that failing status would be recorded as a WF (withdrawal while failing). R may initially plan to
answer *You can drop 577 by

...*. However, Q would expect

t o be told tbat his proposed action does not

achieve his I-goal. Formula [7] states R's belief about this expectation.
[6]RB(-holds(-fail(Q,C), drop(Q,CASc)) 62 admissible(drop(Q,C#c))

)

[7] RBQB(RB[ want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) & -holds(-fail(Q,C),drop(Q,CASc))
& admissible(drop(Q,C~Sc))]

* likely (inJorm-that [R,Q,

-.holds(-. jail(Q,C), drop(Q,C)(Sc))),Sc))

R's full response is, *You can drop 577 by

.... However,

you will atill jail.*

Furthermore, given the

reasoning in sect.ion 3.1.1 above, R's full response would also inform Q if there is an action b tbat the user
can take instead.

A better way
Suppose R believes that there is a better way to achieve

8.8.

Q's I-goal, cf. [8]

- for example, taking an

incomplete to have additional time to perform the work, and thereby not losing all the effort Q has
already expended. Q would expect that R, as a cooperative expert, would inform him of such a better
way, cf. 191. If R doesn't, R risks misleading Q that there isn't one.

[9] RBQB(RB[want(Q,-fail(Q,C)) &

\

RB[(3b)[holds(-.fail(Q,C , b(Sc)) & admissible(b(Sc)) &
better(b,drop(Q,C)(ScJ
=+likely(inj m - t h a t (R,Q,

(3b)/?tolds(-fail(Q,C),b[Sc))
El admiaaiblefi[Sc)) d
bett er(b,dro~(Q,C)(sc)))) Sc)])
R's direct response is to indicate how j can be done. R's full response includes, in addition, 'b is a better
way.'
Notice that if R doesn't explicitly tell Q that he is presenting a better way (i.e., he just presents the
method), Q may be misled that the response addresses his S-goal: i.e., he may falsely conclude that he is
being told how t o drop the course. (The possibility shows up clearer in other examples

- e.g., if R omits

the first sentence of the response below
Q: How do I get to Marsh Creek on the Expressway?
R: It's faster and shorter t o take Route 30. Go out
Lancaster Ave until ....
Thus even when adhering t o expert response behavior in terms of addressing an I-goal, we must keep the
system aware of potentially misleading aspects of its modified response as well.
Note that R may believe that Q expects t o be told the best way. This would change the second axiom to
include within the scope of the existential quantifier
(Va){~(a=b)=+[holds(-.fail(Q,C), a@)) & admissible(a(Sc)) & better(b,a)])

3.4. T h e only w a y
Suppose there is nothing inconsistent about what the user has proposed

- i.e., all preconditions

are met

and it will achieve the user's goal. R's direct response would simply be to tell Q how. However, if R
notices that that is the only way to achieve the goal (cf. [lo]), it could optionally notify Q of that, cf. 1111.
(101 RB((3!a)(hold~(-.fail(Q~C)~a(Sc))
& admissible(a(Sc)) & a=drop(Q,C)(ScJ)

I

1111 RBQB(RB(want(Q,-fail Q,C)))
& RB((3!a)[holds -.fail(Q,C), a(Sc)) & admissible(a(Sc)) & a=drop(Q,C)(ScJ)
=+likely(inform-that(R, Q,

Sc))
R's full response is 'You can drop 577 by

.... That is the only way to prevent

failing..

3.5. S o m e t h i n g T u r n i n g Up

Suppose there is no appropriate action that Q can take t o achieve his I-goal. That is,
RB( -.(3 a)[admissible(a(Sc)) & holds(g, ~(SC))])
There may still be some event e out of Q's control that could bring about the intended goal. This gives
several more cases of R's modifying his response.
8.6.1. Unlikely event

If e is unlikely t o occur (cf. [12]), Q would expect R t o inform him of e, while noting its implausibiiity, cf.
1131
(121 RB((3e)[admissible(e(Sc)) & holds(-faiI(Q,C), 4%))
& -.likely(e, Sc)])

(13)

4

likely (inform-that(R,

9,
8 holds(- fail(Q,C), e(Sc))

Thus R's full response is, 'You can't drop 577. If e occurs, you will not fail 577, but e is unlikely.'
3.5.2. Likely event

If the event e is likely (cf. [14]), it does not seem necessary t o state it, but it is certainly safe t o do so. A
formula representing this case follows.

R's beliefs about Q's expectations are the same as the previous case except that likely(e, Sc) replaces
-.likely(e, Sc). Thus R's full responcse may be 'You can't drop 577. However, e ia likely to occur, in which
cnze you will not fail 577.'

3.6.3. Event followed b y action
If event e brings about a state in which the enabling conditions of an effective action a are true, cf. [IS]

\

1161 RBQB(RB((3e)(3a)[want(Q,if3il Q,C))& admissible(e(Sc))
& admisible(a(efSc) ) & holds(-.faii(Q,C),a(e(Sc)))])
==+ likely(injorm-that(R,Q,
f3 e)(3 a,) /h01 ds (- j n i.1(Q, C),a (~(SC))))
d
adnai~sibte(a(ejSc)j])),Sc))
then the same principles about informing Q of the likelihood or unlikelihood of e apply as they did before.
In addition, R must inform Q of u, cf. [16]. Thus R's full response would be 'You can't drop 577. Ij e
were to occur, which is (un)likely, you could a and thus not jail 577.'

4. Reasoning
Our intent in using logic has been to have a precise representation language whose syntax informs R's
reasoning about Q's beliefs. Having computed a full response that conforms t.o all these expectations, R
may go on to 'trim' it according to principles of brevity that we do not discuss here.
Our proposal is that the informing behavior is *pre-compiled'.

That is, R does not reason explicitly

about Q's expectations, but rather has compiled the conditions into a case analysis similar t o a
discrimination net. For instance, we can represent informally several of the cases in section 3.

lf adrniasible(drop(Q,Cj(Sc))
then lf 7holds(-4ail(Q,C),droy(Q,C#Sc))
then begin nsn reductive set
v (3a)lad~+t
holds(-.frii(Q,C).YSc))]
then a way
else no way
end
else if (3B)I3rdmissible(b(Sc))&

then a better wa
else 11 (3 b ) [ a d ~ z ( & ) &) holds(-faii(Q,C), ~(SC))]
then a w a z
elre no way

...

Note that we are assuming that R assumes the most demanding expectations by Q. Therefore, R can
reason solely within its own space without missing things.

5. Conclusion
Since the behavior of expert systems will be interpreted in terms of the behavior users expect of
cooperative human experts, we (as system designers) must understand such behavior patterns so as t o
implement them in our systems. If such systems are t o be truly cooperative, it is not sufficient for them t o
be simply truthful. Additionally, they must be able to predict lirnited classes of false inferences that users

might draw from dialogue with them and a h to respond in a way t o prevent those false inferences. The
current enterprise is a small but non-trivial step in this direction. In addition t o questions about achieving
goals, we are investigating other cases where a cooperative expert should prevent false inferences by
another agent, including preventing inappropriate default reasoning 16, JWWMnonmon].
Future work should include
a

identification of additional cases where an expert must prevent false inferences by another
agent,

e

formal statement of a general principle for constaining the search for possible false inferences,
and
design of a natural language planning component t o carry out the informing acts assumed in
this paper.
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